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Abstract—We consider polar subcodes (PSCs), which are
polar codes (PCs) with dynamically-frozen symbols, to increase
the minimum distance as compared to corresponding PCs. A
randomized nested PSC construction with a low-rate PSC and
a high-rate PC, is proposed for list and sequential successive
cancellation decoders. This code construction aims to perform
lossy compression with side information. Nested PSCs are used
in the key agreement problem with physical identifiers. Gains
in terms of the secret-key vs. storage rate ratio as compared
to nested PCs with the same list size are illustrated to show
that nested PSCs significantly improve on nested PCs. The
performance of the nested PSCs is shown to improve with larger
list sizes, which is not the case for nested PCs considered.
I. INTRODUCTION
A common secrecy problem considers the wiretap channel
(WTC) [1]. The WTC encoder aims to hide a transmitted mes-
sage from an eavesdropper with a channel output correlated
with the observation of a legitimate receiver. There are various
code constructions for the WTC that achieve the secrecy ca-
pacity, e.g., in [2]–[5]. Some of these constructions use nested
polar codes (PCs) [6], which have a low encoding/decoding
complexity, asymptotic optimality for various problems, and
good finite length performance if a successive cancellation list
(SCL) decoder in combination with an outer cyclic redundancy
check (CRC) code are used [7]. Similarly, nested PCs achieve
the strong coordination capacity boundaries [8]; see, e.g., [9].
A closely related secrecy problem to the WTC problem is
the key agreement problem with two terminals that observe
correlated random variables and have access to a public,
authenticated, and one-way communication link; whereas an
eavesdropper observes only the public messages called helper
data [10], [11]. There are two common models for key
agreement: the generated-secret (GS) model, where an encoder
extracts a secret key from the sequence observed, and the
chosen-secret (CS) model, where a pre-determined secret key
is given as input to the encoder. The main constraint for this
problem is that the construction should not leak information
about the secret key (negligible secrecy leakage). Furthermore,
a privacy leakage constraint is introduced in [12] to leak as
little information about the identifier as possible. Similarly,
storage in the public communication link can be expensive and
limited, e.g., for internet-of-things (IoT) device applications
[13], [14]. The regions of achievable secret-key vs. privacy-
leakage (key-leakage) rates for the GS and CS models are
given in [12], while the key-leakage-storage regions with
multiple encoder measurements are treated in [15].
An important application of these key agreement models
is the key agreement with physical identifiers such as digital
circuits that have outputs unique to the device that embodies
them. Examples of these physical identifiers are physical
unclonable functions (PUFs) [16], [17]. The start-up behavior
of static random access memories (SRAM) and the speckle
pattern observed from coherent waves propagating through
a disordered medium can serve as PUFs that have reliable
outputs and high entropy [18].
Optimal nested random linear code constructions for the
lossy source coding with side information problem, i.e.,
Wyner-Ziv (WZ) problem [19], are shown in [14] to be optimal
also for the key agreement with PUFs. Thus, nested PCs are
designed in [14], [20] for practical SRAM PUF parameters
to illustrate that nested PCs achieve rate tuples that cannot
be achieved by using previous code constructions. The finite
length performance of the nested PCs designed in [14] without
an outer CRC code is not necessarily good due to small
minimum distance of PCs. Therefore, we propose to increase
the minimum distance by using PCs with dynamically-frozen
symbols (DFSs), i.e., polar subcodes (PSCs) [21].
PSCs represent a generalization of PCs, where frozen
symbols are set to linear combinations of other symbols.
In general, randomized polar subcodes [22] provide better
performance than algebraic polar subcodes [21] under list or
sequential decoding with small list size. We therefore design
codes for key agreement with PUFs by constructing nested
PSCs in a randomized manner. Nested codes have a broad
use, e.g., in WTC and strong coordination problems, so the
proposed construction might be useful also for these problems.
A summary of the main contributions is as follows.
We propose a method to obtain nested PSCs used as a
WZ-coding construction. Furthermore, we develop a design
procedure for the proposed construction adapted to the prob-
lem of key agreement with physical identifiers. Consider
binary symmetric sources (BSSs) and channels (BSCs). Ring
oscillator (RO) PUFs with transform coding [23] and SRAM
PUFs [24] are modeled by these sources and channels. We
design and simulate nested PSCs for SRAM PUFs to illustrate
that nested PSCs with sequential successive cancellation (SC)
decoders for a list size of L=8 achieve significantly larger key
vs. storage rate ratio than previously-proposed codes including
nested PCs from [14] that approach the maximum likelihood
(ML) performance with an SCL decoder for L = 8. Nested
PSC performance is illustrated to further improve with larger
but reasonable list sizes such as L=32, 64.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we describe
the GS and CS models, and evaluate the key-leakage-storage
region for BSSs and BSCs. We propose a randomized nested
PSC construction and a design procedure adapted to key
agreement with PUFs in Section III. Significant key vs. storage
rate ratio gains from nested PSCs as compared to previously-
proposed codes are illustrated in Section IV.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
An identifier output is used to generate a secret key in
the GS model, depicted in Fig. 1(a). The source X , noisy
measurement Y , secret key S, and storage W alphabets are
finite sets. During enrollment, the encoder observes the i.i.d.
identifier output Xn and computes a secret key S and public
helper data W as (S,W )=Enc(Xn). During reconstruction,
the decoder observes a noisy source measurement Y n of the
source outputXn through a memoryless measurement channel
PY |X in addition to the helper data W . The decoder estimates
the secret key as Ŝ=Dec(Y n,W ). Fig. 1(b) shows the CS
model, where a secret key S′ ∈ S is embedded into the helper
data as W ′ = Enc(Xn, S′). The decoder for the CS model
estimates the secret key as Ŝ′ = Dec(Y n,W ′). Since the
analyses for the CS model follow from the analyses for the
GS model, it suffices to consider the GS model to illustrate
the performance gains from nested PSCs.
Definition 1. A key-leakage-storage tuple (Rs, Rℓ, Rw) is
achievable for the GS model if, given any ǫ > 0, there is
some n≥1, an encoder, and a decoder such that Rs =
log |S|
n
and
PB , Pr[Ŝ 6= S] ≤ ǫ (reliability) (1)
I(S;W ) ≤ nǫ (secrecy) (2)
H(S) ≥ n(Rs − ǫ) (key uniformity) (3)
log
∣∣W∣∣ ≤ n(Rw + ǫ) (storage) (4)
I(Xn;W ) ≤ n(Rℓ + ǫ) (privacy). (5)
The key-leakage-storage region Rgs for the GS model is the
closure of the set of achievable tuples. ♦
Suppose the transform-coding algorithm in [23] is applied to
any PUF circuits with continuous-valued outputs to obtain Xn
that is almost i.i.d. according to a uniform Bernoulli random
variable, i.e., Xn ∼ Bernn(12 ), and the channel PY |X is a
BSC(pA) for pA ∈ [0, 0.5]. Define the binary entropy function
Hb(q) = −q log2 q−(1−q) log2(1−q), and the star operation
q ∗p = (1−2p)q+p with its inverse q = (q ∗p−p)/(1−2p).
Corollary 1 ([12]). The key-leakage-storage region Rgs,bin of
the GS model for Xn ∼ Bernn(12 ) and PY |X ∼ BSC(pA) is
PX(·)
(S,W )
(a)
= Enc (Xn)
W ′
(b)
= Enc (Xn, S′)
PY |X(·)
Ŝ
(a)
= Dec (Y n,W )
Ŝ′
(b)
= Dec (Y n,W ′)
(a)W
(b)W ′
Xn Y n
Enrollment Reconstruction
S S′ Ŝ Ŝ′
(a) (b)(a) (b)
Fig. 1. The (a) GS and (b) CS models.
the union over all q ∈ [0, 0.5] of the bounds
0 ≤ Rs ≤ 1−Hb(q ∗ pA) (6)
Rℓ ≥ Hb(q ∗ pA)−Hb(q) (7)
Rw ≥ Hb(q ∗ pA)−Hb(q). (8)
The rate tuples on the boundary of the region Rgs,bin are
uniquely defined by the key vs. storage rate ratio Rs/Rw. We
therefore use this ratio as the metric to compare our nested
PSCs with previously-proposed nested PCs and other channel
codes. A larger key vs. storage rate ratio suggests that the
code construction is closer to an achievable point that is on
the boundary of Rgs,bin, which is an optimal tuple.
III. DESIGN OF NESTED PSCS CONSTRUCTION
Polar codes convert a channel into polarized virtual bit
channels by a polar transform. This transform converts an
input sequence Un with frozen and unfrozen bits to a length-
n codeword. A polar decoder processes a noisy codeword
together with the frozen bits to estimate Un. Let C(n,F , G|F|)
denote a PC or a PSC of length n, where F is the set of indices
of the frozen bits and G|F| is the sequence of frozen bits. In
the following, we extend the nested PC construction proposed
in [25] for the WZ problem.
A. Polar Subcodes and Randomized Construction
PSCs are a generalization of PCs, allowing some frozen
symbols to be equal to linear combinations of other symbols
[21]. Such symbols are referred as dynamically-frozen sym-
bols (DFSs). An (n = 2m, k) PSC is defined by an (n−k)×n
constraint matrix V such that the last non-zero elements of its
rows are located in distinct columns ji ∈ {0, . . . , n − 1} for
0 ≤ i < n − k. The codewords of the polar subcode are
obtained as cn−1 = un−1
(
1 0
1 1
)⊗m
, where the values G|F|
of frozen symbols are calculated as
uji =
ji−1∑
s=0
Visus. (9)
Decoding of PSCs can be implemented by an SC algorithm,
as well as its list and sequential decoding generalizations [7],
[26]. A simple way to obtain PSCs with good performance
under list or sequential decoding with small list size is to
employ a randomized construction introduced in [22]. The
construction involves three types of frozen symbols:
• The indices of statically-frozen symbols (SFSs), which
are a special case of DFSs, are selected as integers ji,
for 0 ≤ i < n− k− tA − tB , of the least reliable virtual
subchannels of the polar transform, so the i-th row of V
has 1 in position ji and 0, otherwise. This corresponds
to constraints uji = 0.
• The indices of type-B DFSs are selected as the integers ji,
for n−k− tA− tB ≤ i < n−k− tA, of the least reliable
virtual subchannels that are not selected as SFSs. The
i-th row of V has 1 in position ji and binary uniformly-
random values in positions s < ji. Type-B DFSs enforce
the scores of incorrect paths in the Tal-Vardy decoding
algorithm to decrease fast, reducing the probability of the
correct path being dropped from the list.
• The indices of type-A DFSs ji, n − k − tA ≤ ji < n −
k, are selected as the largest integers in {0, 1, . . . , n −
1} \ {j0, . . . , jn−k−tA−1} that have the smallest weight,
defined as the number of non-zero bits in a sequence’s
binary representation. The i-th row of V has 1 in position
ji and binary uniformly-random values in positions s <
ji. Type-A DFSs eliminate the low-weight codewords.
The number tA of type-A DFSs and the number tB of type-B
DFSs should be chosen by extensive simulations. For simplic-
ity, we use the suggested parameters for L = 32 in [27], where
tA = min{m,n− k} and tB=max{0,min{64− tA, n− k−
tA}}. To obtain the reliabilities of the subchannels of the polar
transform, we use the min-sum density evolution algorithm
[28] over a BSC(p), where the crossover probability p is a
design parameter to be optimized, in general, by simulations.
One parameter used in the sequential decoder is the priority
queue size D [26], for which we use D = 1024.
B. Randomized Nested PSC Construction
PCs, including PSCs, provide a simple nested code design
due to the control on the subsets of codewords by changing
the frozen bits. We summarise the nested code construction
method proposed for PCs and then extend it to PSCs. We also
provide a design procedure to design nested PSCs for key
agreement with PUFs.
For the GS model with source and channel models given in
Corollary 1, consider two PCs C1(n,F1, V ) and C(n,F , V )
with F = F1 ∪Fw and V = [V,W ], where V has length m1
and W has length m2 such that m1 and m2 satisfy
m1
n
= Hb(q)− δ,
m1 +m2
n
= Hb(q ∗ pA) + δ (10)
for some distortion q ∈ [0, 0.5] as in (6)-(8) and any δ > 0.
We remark that (10) implies a vector quantization (VQ)
code C1 that can achieve an average per-letter distortion of
at most q when n → ∞ since its rate is greater than the
rate-distortion function I(X ;Xq) = 1−Hb(q) at distortion q.
(10) also implies an error-correcting code (ECC) C that can
achieve a negligible error probability for a BSC(q ∗ pA) when
n → ∞ since its rate is smaller than the channel capacity
I(Xq;Y ) = 1−Hb(q ∗ pA).
During enrollment, the encoder treats the uniform binary se-
quence Xn as a noisy observation through a BSC(q). Decoder
of the PC C1 quantizes X
n to a codewordXnq of C1. Applying
the inverse polar transform to Xnq , the encoder calculates U
n
and its bits at indices Fw are stored as the helper data W .
Furthermore, the bits at the indices i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} \ F are
used as the secret key S that has a length of n−m1 −m2.
During reconstruction, the decoder of the PC C observes
the helper data W and the binary sequence Y n. The frozen
bits V = [V,W ] at indices F and Y n are input to the PC
decoder to obtain the codeword X̂nq . Applying the inverse
polar transform to X̂nq , we obtain Û
n that contains the estimate
Ŝ of the secret key at the indices i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} \ F .
We extend the nested PC construction to nested PSCs by
providing exact design parameters. We observe from simu-
lations that VQ performance of PSCs are entirely similar to
the performance of PCs, so we use a PC as the code C1. Let
V
′
S be the constraint matrix for the code C1, i.e., V
′
S contains
unit vectors with 1s in positions F1. Then, we ensure that the
low-rate PSC C has SFSs in indices F1. Hence, the constraint
matrix V of C is given by
V = [(V
′
S)
T
, (V
′′
S)
T
, (VB)
T , (VA)
T ]T (11)
where T represents matrix transpose, VA and VB are sub-
matrices corresponding to type-A and type-B DFSs, respec-
tively, and V′′S corresponds to further SFSs of C. Denote
F = FA ∪ FB ∪ FS as the union of the set of indices for
type-A DFSs, type-B DFSs, and all SFSs of C.
C. Proposed Design Procedure
We propose the following steps to design nested PSCs for
source and channel models given in Corollary 1 with a given
blocklength n, secret-key size n−m1−m2, and a block-error
probability PB . These steps provide exact design parameter
choices for nested PSCs, decided according to the simulation
results over a large set of design parameters.
1) Apply the randomized PSC construction method given in
Section III-A to construct PSCs with rate (n−m1−m2)/n
for a BSC(p) for a range of values in p ∈ (pA, 0.5].
2) Evaluate PB of constructed PSCs with the sequential
decoder in [26] with list size L over a BSC with a
range of crossover probabilities p˜ ∈ (pA, 0.5] to obtain
the crossover probability pc, resulting in the target PB .
Assign the PSC that gives the largest pc as the low-
rate PSC C. Denote sp and spc as p and pc values
corresponding to C, respectively.
3) Using the inverse of the star operation, obtain the ex-
pected target distortion E[q] averaged over all xn∈Xn
as E[q] = (spc − pA)/(1− 2pA).
4) Obtain the reliabilities of virtual subchannels of the polar
transform by using the min-sum density evolution algo-
rithm over a BSC(p¯1), where sp1 = (sp−pA)/(1− 2pA).
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Fig. 2. Block-error probability of C over a BSC with crossover probabilities
p˜ for Codes 1 and 2 with sequential decoders and corresponding spc values
represented by a circle for list size L = 8, square for L = 32, and pentagon
for L = 64.
5) Arrange the subchannel reliabilities obtained in Step 4 in
a descending order. Consecutively remove indices from
the set F , starting from the most reliable subchannels,
until an average distortion sq = 1
n
∑n
i=1Xi ⊕ Xq,i of
at most E[q] is achieved, where ⊕ denotes modulo-2
summation. Assign the remaining indices, i.e., the un-
removed least reliable subchannel indices, as the frozen
symbol indices of the high-rate code C1, denoted as F1.
Step 4 suggests that the design parameter sp of C determines the
design parameter sp1 for C1. The total number of DFSs of C is
tA+tB, as defined in Section III-A. Therefore, if the difference
between the rate of C1 and of C, i.e.,∆R , Hb(q∗pA)−Hb(q),
is larger than (tA+ tB)/n, then C1 is a PC because DFSs are
the most reliable frozen symbols. The difference n∆R is larger
than tA + tB for the SRAM PUF parameters we consider in
the next section as ∆R increases with increasing pA.
Remark 1. This randomized nested PSC construction provides
additional degree of freedom such that the same code can be
used for different PB values or for different crossover values
pA by adapting the expected distortion level.
IV. PROPOSED NESTED PSCS FOR PUFS
Consider the scenario where we generate a secret key S
with length n−m1−m2=128 bits to use it in the advanced
encryption standard (AES). Suppose intellectual property in a
field-programmable gate array (FPGA) with an SRAM PUF
should be protected so that the target block-error probability
PB is 10
−6 [30]. SRAM PUF measurement channels PY |X
are modeled as a BSC(pA=0.15) [24]. We apply the design
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Fig. 3. Average distortion sq with respect to n−m1 for Codes 1 and 2 with
sequential decoders and corresponding E[q] values represented by a circle for
list size L = 8, square for L = 32, and pentagon for L = 64.
procedure proposed in Section III-C for these parameters to
design Codes 1 and 2 with sequential decoders for list sizes
L = [8, 32, 64].
Code 1: Consider nested PSCs with blocklength n = 1024.
First, design the code C of rate 128/1024 by applying Steps 1
and 2 in Section III-C for L = 8 and obtain sp. Fig. 2 depicts
the p˜ vs. PB curves for code C with sequential decoders with
list sizes L = [8, 32, 64]. We observe PB=10
−6 in Fig. 2 at
crossover probabilities of spc = [0.1988, 0.2096, 0.2128] such
that we obtain E[q] = [0.0697, 0.0852, 0.0898] by Step 3 for
L = [8, 32, 64], respectively, where we apply sp found for L =
8 to all list sizes for simplicity. Applying Step 4, we obtain
the design parameter for the code C1 and evaluate the average
distortion sq by applying Step 5. Fig. 3 depicts the n − m1
vs. sq curves obtained by applying Step 5. Code 1 achieves
sq = E[q] in Fig. 3 at m2 = [553, 492, 475] bits of helper data,
sufficing to reconstruct a 128-bit secret key with PB = 10
−6
for L = [8, 32, 64], respectively.
Code 2: Consider nested PSCs with the same parame-
ters as in Code 1, except n = 2048. Fig. 2 shows that
crossover probabilities of spc = [0.2756, 0.2861, 0.2883] satisfy
PB = 10
−6, so the expected target distortions are E[q] =
[0.1795, 0.1944, 0.1975] for L = [8, 32, 64], respectively. Code
2 achieves sq = E[q] in Fig. 3 at m2 = [578, 505, 490] bits,
which should be stored as helper data to generate a key size
of 128 bits with PB = 10
−6 for L = [8, 32, 64], respectively.
A. Rate Region Performance
We evaluate the key-leakage-storage regionRgs,bin for pA =
0.15 and plot its storage-key (Rw, Rs) projection in Fig. 4.
Furthermore, we plot in Fig. 4 the tuples achieved by Codes 1
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Fig. 4. Storage-key rates for key generation with crossover probability pA = 0.15. The block-error probability satisfies PB ≤ 10
−6 and the key length is
128 bits for all code points. The dashed line represents Rw + Rs = H(X) = 1 bit/symbol. All codes with Rw = 1 bit/symbol are ECCs. The PC on the
dashed line is a syndrome-coding construction.
and 2, previous nested PCs given in [14], the syndrome-coding
construction proposed in [29], and by the classic constructions
that are code-offset fuzzy extractors (COFE) [31] and the fuzzy
commitment scheme (FCS) [32].
We observe from Fig. 4 that Code 1 with L = 8 achieves a
key vs. storage rate ratio of 0.2315, improving on the nested
PC 1 ratio of 0.1969 achieved in [14] with the same list
size. This result illustrates that nested PSCs achieve the best
key vs. storage ratio in the literature for the same list size.
Furthermore, increasing the list size of Code 1 to L = 32
allows to achieve a ratio of 0.2602, which is a substantial gain
as compared to L = 8 case. Further increase in the list size
does not improve the achieved ratio significantly, where Code
1 with L = 64 achieves 0.2698. This result might be due to the
choice of the numbers tA and tB of type-A and type-B DFSs
adapted to L = 32, so one might improve the performance
of larger list sizes by choosing different tA and tB . Similarly,
Code 2 with L = 8 achieves a Rs/Rw ratio of 0.2215, better
than 0.2095 achieved by the nested PC 2 proposed in [14]. The
ratio increases to 0.2535 and 0.2612 by increasing the list size
to L = 32 and L = 64, respectively. Thus, the largest Rs/Rw
ratio in the literature for SRAM PUFs is achieved by Code 1,
for which n = 1024 bits, with L = 64. Its performance might
be improved by optimising tA and tB .
The decoding complexities of the list and sequential decod-
ing algorithms in [26] depend on the quality of PY |X , i.e.,
pA for our model. Their complexities are upper bounded by
the complexity O(Ln log2 n) of the SCL decoder, where L is
the maximal number of times the decoder is allowed to visit
each phase (equivalent to the list size in the Tal-Vardy SCL
decoding algorithm [7] used for nested PCs), but they converge
to O(n log2 n) fast with a channel bit error rate approaching
0, i.e., when pA → 0 for our model as in [33].
V. CONCLUSION
We proposed a randomized nested polar subcode construc-
tion, which can be useful also for other information-theoretic
problems. We proposed a design procedure to use a polar
subcode as an error-correcting code and a polar code as a
vector quantizer such that the codes are nested. Nested polar
subcodes are designed for the source and channel models
used for SRAM PUFs to illustrate significant gains in terms
of the key vs. storage rate ratio as compared to previous
code designs including nested polar codes. In future work,
we will propose other code constructions that can perform
close to the finite-length bounds one can straightforwardly
calculate by combining the separate finite-length bounds for
error correction and for vector quantization, which are valid
also for nested code constructions considered.
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